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ABSTRACT 
Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts 
viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with 
emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-
truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-
value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. 
Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting 
influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse Steve Fuller’s use of 
the term «post-truth» – especially, the political connotations about epistemic 
democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the 
truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy. 
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 Democracy and Inquiry in the Post-Truth Era: 
A pragmatist Solution 
 
 
 
A NA  C U E VA S - B A DA L L O  A N D  DA N I E L  L A B R A D O R-
M O N T E R O   
 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
N 2016, AFTER A SPIKE IN FREQUENCY, the Oxford Dictionaries chose «post-
truth» as word of the year. 2016 was the year of the Brexit referendum 
and the presidential election in the United States. That Dictionary 
defines «post-truth» as «relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective 
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and 
personal belief». It specifies that the prefix «post» is used not in a temporal sense 
«but in the sense that truth has been eclipsed – that it is irrelevant».  
Several important elements of that definition need to be considered in order 
to understand some responses to the use of post-truth. To begin with, objective 
facts are viewed in opposition to emotions and personal beliefs, which are 
subjective. Secondly, there is an underlying normativity about the appropriate 
source for formation of public opinion. To shed some light on these matters, it is 
important to examine how «objective facts» are closely connected to the manner 
in which «evidence» should be gathered. To understand how citizens, collect 
information and create their own opinions requires an analysis of their role as 
inquirers and the role of scientific knowledge in modern societies.   
We shall show that post-truth is different from other kinds of lies, precisely 
because of its public use. Post-truths are uttered in an arena where the person 
proffering an affirmation does not care about truth value: his or her intentions 
are to construct a set of ‘alternative facts’ and shared views, usually serving the 
interest of the speaker. However (crucially), the same can be said of the receiver 
of the message: post-truth depends on a lack of care about how to gather 
evidence, and about the truth-value, both on the part of the person making the 
utterance and on the part of the receiver. Those attitudes raise a number of 
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questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary 
democracies.  
In this paper, we analyse Steve Fuller’s use of the term ‘post-truth’, with 
particular focus on the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he 
emphasises. The elements mentioned (gathering evidence and public opinion) 
will be necessary to understand our pragmatist defence of the truth and the 
construction of real epistemic democracy. 
In the first part of the paper, we analyse some strategies similar to post-truth 
that have been used to «create opinion», and suggest a different definition, 
whereby post-truth represents a new twist in the meaning of propaganda. We 
briefly analyse the implications of the defence of post-truth by Steve Fuller, in 
whose view its advent represents an opportunity to establish epistemic democracy. 
In the coming sections, our aim is to explore the epistemic and the socio-political 
consequences of our approach to post-truth. Firstly, we examine the need to re-
evaluate the concept of truth, to avoid the temptations of relativism, reclaiming 
the pragmatist sense of good inquiry using Susan Haack’s account of truth, 
inquiry and pseudo-inquiry. In the last section, we use Dewey’s notion of 
democracy, considered by many to be one of the precursors of epistemic 
democracy. Our argument in this paper is that Dewey’s consideration of inquiry 
and flourishing in democracy could be the best defence of a real epistemic 
democracy. 
 
§2. Post-thruth and related concepts  
Fuller has a tendency to make shocking interpretations, which differ radically 
from those that are generally accepted in the philosophical community. It is a 
fruitful strategy, both for him and for those who disagree. His extremist and, 
sometimes, awkward opinions help the community to reach compromises on red 
lines that need to be set (see, for instance, Latour 2004, or more recently, 
Sismondo 2017). In that sense, Fuller’s definition encourages us to ask whether 
it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of questionable statements 
in the public arena, whether there is something like objective facts and their 
relationship with evidence and truth, as well as what we mean by «epistemic 
democracy».  
Let us begin by distinguishing terms that are semantically related to post-
truth. Some are old, such as «lie» or «propaganda»; but others are newer, like 
«spin» or «bullshit» (at least in the field of philosophy). As we shall see later on, 
post-truth incorporates a different twist to those terms.  
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§2.1. Lie, spin, propaganda, bullshit, and post-truth  
Lie, according to the Oxford Dictionaries, means: «an intentionally false 
statement». Intentionality is definitive in distinguishing a mistake from a lie. 
Without the intention to deceive, a statement may be false, or unknown. When 
somebody tells a lie, that person knows that what is being uttered is different to 
what she thinks is true. Sawyer states, «we understand a lie to be a statement that 
is at a discernible distance from an identifiable objective fact» (Sawyer 2018, p. 
55). The person who proffers the statement knows that it differs from objective 
fact. 
Spin or a certain kind of propaganda are more common in political circles, 
where «twisting the truth» is relatively frequent. «Spin is principally understood 
as a phenomenon of strategies of political messaging. This means something like 
the observation of a set of facts, like the unemployment rate between the years 
2008 and 2016 that can then be manipulated for political advantage» (Sawyer 
2018, p. 56). In that case, the utterance may merely be partially true (or partially 
untrue). However, the intention behind the manipulation is to reduce any 
potential negative impact on public opinion. The distance between the statement 
and the objective fact may be only a matter of interpretation. The person hearing 
the statement may be partially deceived; nevertheless, spin must contain some 
quantity of information proximate to objective facts. It is like describing 
something with a focus only on the positive or negative features that are relevant 
for our purposes, but it is not an out-and-out lie.  
In the case of Propaganda, the utterances are not necessarily lies, but the 
emphasis is on the intention of those disseminating the information: to 
manipulate. Jason Stanley (2015), in his recent work How Propaganda Works, 
suggests that propaganda is not necessarily negative, but is dangerous when used 
in a liberal democracy (Stanley 2015, p. 11). Demagogues take advantage of one 
of the most highly prized features of liberal democracies: freedom of speech. 
They use it for their own interests, and those interests do not necessarily coincide 
with the concerns of the rest of citizens. Eduard S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 
in their classic Manufacturing Consent (paying tribute to Walter Lippmann’s 
«manufacture of consent»), held that for its dissemination, propaganda needs 
broad channels and wide audiences, and if possible, to seize the audience’s 
attention almost exclusively. 
In 2005, Harry G. Frankfurt published an essay reviewing a term in 
widespread use in English: bullshit. Bullshit is «unconnected to a concern with 
the truth»; it «is not germane to the enterprise of describing reality»; and it 
proceeds «without any regard for how things really are» (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 30). 
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Bullshit «cannot be regarded as lying», because bullshitters do not «presume» to 
«know the truth» and thus cannot be accused of promoting a false position or 
describing a false reality (p. 33). «The liar is inescapably concerned with truth-
values» (p. 51), while the bullshitter is not. According to Frankfurt, it is «this 
indifference to how things really are» that is «the essence of bullshit» (p. 34). 
Bullshit is indifferent to the truth; «the statements people make do not 
necessarily reveal what they really believe or how they really feel» (p. 36). Thus, 
bullshit is pure strategic communication with no reference to reality or truth. 
Is there any semantic space left for post-truth? In which sense is post-truth 
different from lies, propaganda, spin or plain bullshit? There are several 
definitions of post-truth. A small but representative cluster of such definitions is 
presented below, contrasting with Fuller’s. 
Kathleen Higgins considers «Post-truth refers to blatant lies being routine 
across society, and it means that politicians can lie without condemnation. This 
is different from the cliché that all politicians lie and make promises they have 
no intention to keep — this still expects honesty to be the default position. In a 
post-truth world, this expectation no longer holds» (Higgins, 2016, p. 9). Higgins 
emphasises the role of politicians as mouthpieces of flagrant lies, and portrays 
citizens not as naïve but as disenchanted receptors of the lies.  
Bruce McComiskey, in a recent essay, defines post-truth as «a state in which 
language lacks any reference to facts, truths, and realities. When language has no 
reference to facts, truths, or realities, it becomes a purely strategic medium. In a 
post-truth communication landscape, people (especially politicians) say whatever 
might work in a given situation, whatever might generate the desired result, 
without any regard to the truth value or facticity of statements» (McComiskey 
2017, p. 6). This definition combines the strategies of propaganda («politicians 
say whatever might work in a given situation»), with the lack of interest in the 
truth symptomatic of bullshit, and again emphasises the role of politicians as 
those uttering post-truth.  
Michael Sawyer presents another definition: «Post-truth is a discernibly 
different phenomenon that allows for the later refutation of objective facts. 
Regimes of post-truth seem to depend upon establishing an archive (that is 
accessible to and understandable by the public) of self-referential data that are 
not verifiable through other methods of establishing objective facts» (Sawyer 
2018, p. 56). In this case, Sawyer does not make an explicit reference to 
politicians but instead refers to «regimes» where there is a «public» to whom to 
sell the post-truth. 
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We favour a slightly different conception of post-truth. In our view, post-truth 
combines two components: (i) the epistemic component: the indifference as to 
the public relevance of the truth value, on the part of both transmitter and 
receiver. All the above definitions emphasise the role of the transmitter: an 
essential role, as that person is responsible for her utterance. However, they 
overlook the essential role of those who receive the message and do not care 
about the content of the utterance, accepting it without contrasting or inquiring. 
On the other hand, this inattentiveness has repercussions for (ii) the socio-
political component, where intentions, interests, and methods for transmitting 
the message are intertwined. Particular interests prevail over the evidence (for 
the transmitter and also for the receiver), thereby diminishing the value of truth. 
Both components have worrying consequences for the quality of modern 
democracies. 
Instead of dealing with objective facts — as other definitions, for the most 
part, have done — we rather prefer to deal with «evidence». Evidence, defined as 
the outcome of a process of inquiry between the observer and the observed, is a 
relationship rooted in context and culture, but also in the features of what is 
being observed. «Inquiry» is understood as those activities that allow us to 
interpret reality. Of course, inquiry can be done in varying degrees of depth and 
to varying extents. In addition, although scientific inquiry is a successful form of 
inquiry for solving certain kinds of problems, science is not the only kind of 
inquiry; nor can every kind of problem be solved using scientific methodology. 
The interests of the person or group carrying out the inquiry cannot be ignored, 
but it is possible to distinguish between good and bad interests, or between selfish 
interests and collective and munificent ones. 
 
§2.2. Fuller’s view of post-truth  
In what sense does Fuller’s definition depart from previous definitions of post-
truth? In Fuller’s words, «I take post-truth to be a deep feature of at least Western 
intellectual life, bringing together issues of politics, science, and judgement in 
ways which established authorities have traditionally wished to be kept separate» 
(Fuller 2018, p. 6). He considers post-truth the outcome of the tension between 
the «foxes» and the «lions», to use Vilfredo Pareto’s terminology. Fuller considers 
that the main difference between those who defend «Truth» and those who 
defend «Post-truth» is grounded in a power play. «Post-truthers» look for a 
change in the rules: «They believe that what passes for truth is relative to the 
knowledge game one is playing, which means that depending on the game being 
played, certain parties are advantaged over others» (Fuller 2018, p. 53). Who wins 
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or loses does not depend on anything outside of the power game. In that sense, 
there is nothing like objective facts, from Fuller’s point of view: «Scientific facts 
are “hard” only in the context of academically defined games of “hypothesis 
testing”, in terms of which the contestants may gain or lose plausibility. Outside 
of that context, such “facts” function more as placeholders, perhaps even 
metaphors, for a desired direction of policy travel» (Fuller 2018, p. 18). The 
foxes, in Fuller’s reading of Pareto’s theory, are those who look for the change; 
on the other side, the lions, representing the scientists, expect to remain in 
power. Scientists are part of the elite in power, and they merely defend the status 
quo. Fuller briefly summarises what scientists do:  
 
«(1) Scientists do whatever they do in a lab. (2) They publish something that convinces their 
learned colleagues that something happened there, which sets off a train of actions that starts 
by imprinting itself on the collective body of scientific knowledge and ultimately on the world 
at large as an ‘expert’ judgment. (3) Yet –so the ‘truthers’ tell us –in the end what confers 
legitimacy on the fact (i.e. makes it ‘true’) is something outside this process, a reality to which it 
‘corresponds’» (Fuller 2018, p. 42).  
 
Nevertheless, this simplified and schematic description does not nullify the 
outcome of scientific work. Specifically, the interest lies in knowing what scientists 
«do in a lab», how they «convince» other scientists, and how that «something» 
becomes part of the «body of scientific knowledge». Descriptions like Fuller’s 
leave to the readers the responsibility of filling in the blanks, implying in some 
sense that those activities are esoteric (p. 61), questionable or suspicious. 
However, to reach agreement in the realm of science involves a complex process, 
but one which is not necessarily esoteric. In the next section, we shall delve 
deeper into this description. 
Fuller continues his argument using a particular interpretation of Pareto’s 
theory of elites. He holds that «post-truth is the inevitable outcome of greater 
epistemic democracy» (Fuller 2018, p. 61). However, that conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from Pareto’s model. Pareto’s theory of elites is grounded in 
several works: the theory of the rule of elites accompanies what is known as «the 
Pareto principle».1 According to this principle, in all societies, at any time, the 
top 20% of the population have always owned 80% of all resources. The elite is 
split into two categories: foxes or lions, which dominate in alternation 
throughout history.  
 
1  That principle appeared in the Course in Political Economics (1896), but also in Rise and Fall of Elites 
(1901), and more deeply in Treatise on General Sociology (1916). 
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Foxes are not necessarily citizens who have decided to rebuild a new kind of 
knowledge or new kind of truth, as Fuller implies. Foxes can be using those 
«instruments of knowledge production» to take power, but not necessarily for the 
citizens’ interest, but for their own elitist group’s sake. Foxes can be defending 
the post-truth and supporting the «double truth» doctrine: they can know that a 
statement is false, but they defend it anyway as if the statement were true. As Erik 
Baker and Naomi Oreskes point out: «The winner of this particular “game” is 
almost always status quo power: the conservative billionaires, fossil fuel 
companies, lead and benzene, and tobacco manufacturers and others who have 
bankrolled think tanks and “litigation science” at the cost of biodiversity, human 
health and even human lives.» (Baker & Oreskes 2017, p 7). 
Fuller’s definition of post-truth also departs from the most common 
interpretations in that he denies the existence of «objective facts»: those in 
authority «manufacture» those kinds of facts. However, a position of authority 
can be gained by different means, not all of them necessarily illicit. Fuller 
associates «scientists» with Pareto’s lions: one part of the established elite, 
resisting any challenge to their authority. Nonetheless, to describe the scientific 
community as an elite does not fit with the general behavioural standards of the 
scientific community itself: an institution whose norms include an attitude of 
unerring scepticism, and the quest for objectivity. The main requisite for 
becoming part of that institution is to show intellectual capacity, which is more 
or less equally distributed among different classes. Of course, that does not mean 
that the scientific community is free from prejudices, as the history of science has 
revealed (among others, racism and sexism are known to have contaminated 
scientific work), and insofar as scientific research needs financial resources in 
order to be produced, some scientific projects are too close to particular funding 
sources. Nevertheless, one virtue of scientific knowledge is its openness. Almost 
anyone can access scientific publications, attend scientific conferences, or science 
classes. Scientific knowledge can be described as difficult, complicated, hard, and 
challenging, but not esoteric — at least, not in the sense that a Papal Conclave, 
the Board of Directors of a company, or a Masonic Lodge is. 
Despite Fuller’s taste for provocation, his account is the age-old concept of 
relativism, dressed up in colourful description. Relativism has had many 
interpretations, and Fuller is assuming both an epistemic and a sociological 
relativistic point of view. Zackariasson, examining Fuller’s interpretation of post-
truth, links agreement with certain beliefs and truths with oppression:  
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«So, we seem, then, to lack even the possibility of convergence between views, and should 
convergence perchance occur, then suspicions will immediately arise that it results from 
oppression and silencing of important marginalized voices, rather than from rational 
deliberation or demonstration. The frustrating conclusion need not be the extremely skeptical 
view that there is no truth: we can just as well—and equally frustrating to many — say that there 
are actually (too) many truths, many different local perspectives and approaches that all can 
claim a limited validity, but as far as anyone can tell, there is no God’s eye point of view from 
which to adjudicate between them. A post-truth condition would then be one that has given up 
on the idea of “Truth” in the singular as the end-point of inquiry and instead has come to see 
politics, science, and so on, as continuous battles between different truth-regimes seeking to 
dominate the agenda» (Zackariasson 2018, p. 3). 
 
In the same vein, Fuller defends post-truth as the real epistemic democracy. 
However, when such arguments are used, proponents are assuming that 
epistemic democracy, egalitarianism or any other kind of political perspective is 
better than others. Why, though, should epistemic democracy be better than 
epistemic absolutism if there are no good reasons for this point of view? It must, 
of course, be acknowledged that those criticisms about naive characterisations of 
scientific knowledge and truth have helped produce a better understanding of 
science; however, relativism is not a necessary conclusion. 
In Fuller’s view, relativism is the epistemic consequence of tolerance. 
However, relativism in scientific activity jeopardises essential values such as 
integrity or publicity of the processes and outcomes (in the sense in which John 
Dewey employs the term). In science, tolerance emerges from the recognition of 
equality among scientists, who are part of a diverse scientific community. This 
community has been established upon shared and agreed foundations, and upon 
institutionalised goals and criteria. 
On the other hand, as Sergio Sismondo — the editor of Social Studies of Science, 
a publication far removed from indulgent analysis about the construction of 
scientific knowledge — states:  
 
«Embracing epistemic democratization does not mean a wholesale cheapening of 
technoscientific knowledge in the process. STS’s detailed accounts of the construction of 
knowledge show that it requires infrastructure, effort, ingenuity and validation structures. Our 
arguments that “it could be otherwise” are very rarely that “it could easily be otherwise”; instead, 
they point to other possible infrastructures, efforts, ingenuity and validation structures. (…) 
Epistemic democratization has to involve more equitable political economies of knowledge. (…) 
If the post-truth era starts by blowing up current knowledge structures, then it isn’t very likely to 
be democratization, and in fact most likely leads to authoritarianism» (Sismondo 2017, p. 3). 
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In the next sections, we propose a pragmatist solution to some of these problems. 
Firstly, we recommend a diverse conception of inquiry and truth, based on Susan 
Haack’s difference between «inquiry» and «pseudo-inquiry», and between the 
«truth-concept» and the «truth of propositions». Later on, we shall come back to 
the relationship between inquiry, truth and epistemic democracy, and advocate a 
pragmatist interpretation of the main features of an epistemic democracy. 
 
§3. Epistemology in the Post-Truth Era  
The conjunction between epistemological and socio-political levels in the 
phenomenon of post-truth phenomena manifests itself in pseudo-scientific 
strategies. Epistemological theory is a breeding ground for pseudoscience and 
bad science. Pseudosciences share several characteristics with post-truth: (i) the 
public and routine use of «blatant lies». Both pseudoscientists and 
«pseudoscience customers» have no concern for truth and facts; (ii) lack of 
reference to facts, data, contrasted tests, etc. (iii) non-epistemic interest in the 
search for results; (iv) pseudoscience and post-truth are a problem related to 
public opinion; (v) no concern for evidence: facts and data are relevant only as 
tools to help reach some goal; (vi) an intention to manipulate.  
Based on the above, in the coming sections, we suggest: firstly, a pragmatist 
and epistemological view of the truth and the features of adequate scientific 
knowledge production; and, later, the social and political implications of the post-
truth era in democratic societies. 
 
§3.1. Truth, Inquiry, and Pseudo-Inquiry 
In the post-truth era, inquiry and science are in danger, while pseudo-inquiry and 
pseudoscience gain ground. However, before proceeding, it is essential to explain 
what we mean by inquiry and pseudo-inquiry, as well as by truth. It is necessary to 
recover the spirit of «non-vulgar pragmatism». The approaches of Haack and 
Dewey could serve as good baselines to carry out such restoration. 
In the previous sections, we have held that collective indifference to truth 
entails relativism and a voluntary lack of concern for inquiry. According to Haack 
(1999; 2002a; 2002b), all kinds of inquiry require an orientation towards the 
achievement of true knowledge. This is only possible if evidence is the main axis 
upon which to develop the process of inquiry and balance the results. Only when 
the inquirer is committed to truth, evidence and, ultimately, knowledge, is 
genuine research produced. On the contrary, if that commitment were avoided, 
pseudo-inquiry would be the outcome. 
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Haack (1996; 1999; 2002b) considers that there are two kinds of pseudo-
inquiry: sham and fake pseudo-inquiry. The first one could be called dogmatic, 
where inquirers are absolutely and dogmatically committed to some conclusion 
that has been established in advance. In this case, the research activities depend 
on the achievement and satisfaction of pre-established objectives. On the other 
hand, fake inquirers are not committed to the search for truth. They do not care 
about the truth-value of their propositions. They only conduct research for other 
purposes (personal goals, group goals, power goals, scholarships, etc.): 
 
«Peirce identifies one kind of pseudoinquiry when he writes of “sham reasoning”: attempts, not 
to get to the truth of some question, but to make a case for the truth of some proposition one’s 
commitment to which is already evidence- and argument-proof. […] And then there is what I 
have come to think of as fake reasoning: attempts not to get to the truth of some question, but 
to make a case for the truth of some proposition to which one’s only commitment is a conviction 
that advocating it will advance oneself – also a familiar phenomenon when, as in some areas of 
contemporary academic life, a clever defense of a startlingly false or impressively obscure idea is 
a good route to reputation and money» (Haack 1996a, p. 58). 
 
Fake inquiry, just like fake news, is an unavoidable consequence in a post-truth 
society. Lack of concern for truth is as destructive as dogmatism. After all, 
dogmatism requires disdain or disappointment concerning evidence and truth. 
Accordingly, for Haack, truth should be the purpose that defines all inquiry — 
even more so in the case of scientific inquiry. An inquiry is a search for 
understanding of some aspects of the real world. However, this statement does 
not imply accepting that inquirers know or discover a world independent of 
human theorisation and action. Similarly, scientific inquiry is like any other 
inquiry (Haack 2002b, p. 41), but a more sophisticated and institutionalised one. 
Several characteristics make science a special kind of inquiry:  
 
1)  Scientists work in a social system based on a set of fundamental values. 
Although often, these values do not govern the practice of individual 
scientists, they have historically been used as a guide for reward and 
sanction. There are tacit agreements within the scientific community, 
ruling the system of scientific publication and evaluation. In this context, 
publicity has as high a value as the quest for truth.  
2)  The social system of science allows different approaches to the same 
issue, and lays down social criteria to discern between good and bad 
evidence.  
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3)  Scientists use many kinds of instruments to carry out their inquiries: 
technological artefacts and infrastructures that allow them to reach 
where the human senses cannot, as well as models, analogies, surveys, 
mathematics, experiments, etc. 
 
In summary, all inquiry — and especially scientific inquiry — is based on the goal 
of obtaining truths about the world. Truth and evidence are two of the main 
criteria on which the quality of the inquiry and the results obtained are judged 
(or should be judged). Pseudo-sciences emerge and grow when the truth is 
excluded from the scope of scientific inquiries. Then, intellectual integrity and 
honesty come into question. However, the only tool to avoid the collapse of 
science and the strengthening of pseudo-research is social commitment to a 
scientific model of inquiry; a model built on publicity (in the sense in which 
Merton’s uses the term), in evaluation based on evidence and the (relatively 
dispassionate) quest for truth. Evidence always requires interpretation and, 
therefore, there must be social agreement about what is considered good 
evidence and how to evaluate its quality. It is not a guarantee of objectivity in the 
traditional sense, but it is better than defining evidence on the basis of personal 
interests, or of economic, political or other goals. 
Specifically, inquiry is defined as the search for truth: this is something all 
types of inquiry have in common. Researching implies searching for the truth 
about the object of research, putting aside personal beliefs and goals. Of course, 
there are many examples of scientists being dishonest and self-interested. 
However, for precisely this reason, a socially constructed set of values concerning 
inquiry is needed. Those values should encourage and reward good scientific 
behaviour. Haack (1996, pp. 58-59) defines this behaviour: 
 
«The genuine inquirer […] is motivated, therefore, to seek out and assess the worth of evidence 
and arguments thoroughly and impartially; to acknowledge, to himself as well as others, where 
his evidence and arguments seem shakiest and his articulation of problem or solution vaguest; 
to go with the evidence even to unpopular conclusions or conclusions that undermine his 
formerly deeply held convictions». 
 
The main conclusion is that intellectual integrity requires a love for truth, and 
any inquiry is impossible without intellectual collective integrity. Intellectual 
dishonesty supports pseudo-inquiry and pseudoscience. Scientists have 
established historically and socially the value and practically of trusting in faithful 
evidence to obtain dependable knowledge. Later on, we shall explain what it is 
meant by truth without naivety, but also, without frustration. 
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§3.2. Truth as Criterion 
Truth is about propositions. There is no such thing as the «world’s own language» 
(Putnam 1995, p. 29). We can accept this claim but, in spite of it, affirm the 
central role of truth in inquiry. There are no true things, because being «true» is 
not an intrinsic property of things. Only beliefs and theories can be true. Beliefs 
and theories concern humans, so the acknowledgment that something is «true» 
is also a human action. In other words, truth does not exist without human 
beings. 
When Haack (2005, p. 88) asserts, «there is one truth, but many truths», she 
is distinguishing between the «truth-concept» and the «truth of propositions». 
The first is not relative, but the truth of propositions depends on the situation 
(in the Deweyan sense, including human contexts). Those who defend a 
relativistic point of view, like Fuller, are confusing the fact that there are no 
definitive and infallible true propositions or theories with the impossibility of 
having a unified truth-concept. 
Haack describes the truth-concept as follows: «to say that a claim is true is to 
say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, or that it follows from this or that 
theory, or that there is good evidence for it, but) simply that things are as it says» 
(Haack, 2005, p. 88). When somebody says that something is true, that person 
thinks what she is affirming is indeed true, and corresponds to reality. However, 
by a pragmatist standard, reality is not an independent world or one which is 
unaltered by human beings. As Dewey asserts: The mind ‘is formed out of 
commerce with the world and is set toward that world’; it should never be 
regarded as ‘something self-contained and self-enclosed’ (1934, p. 269).2 People 
participate actively in the construction of knowledge and reality. They are not 
mere passive «spectators» (Dewey 1929/1984). This does not mean they can 
shape the world as they please. Human beings are limited by their real context, 
their biological and evolutionary capacities, and their cultural and social 
influence. Even in a post-truth era, human beings cannot do whatever they want.  
However, this does not mean that humans cannot reach agreement about 
some truths. Actually, to say that something is true is to affirm that it is accessible 
for anyone and everyone if all of them were in the same situation. In this sense, 
there is no difference between truth and post-truth: both require collective 
mechanisms and guidelines. Nevertheless, the purposes of those mechanisms are 
very different. Truth is justified according to evidence-based knowledge and 
 
2  In similar terms, Putnam (1981, p. XI) asserts, «the mind and the world jointly make up the mind 
and the world». 
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methods socially considered reliable, whereas post-truth becomes strong in 
contexts where people do not care about how conclusions are reached, but only 
about the benefits they can obtain. In post-truth, pseudo-inquiries (where 
evidence is not important) are used to reach conclusions that have been formed 
previously (reinforcing opinion): in Fuller’s words «to gain competitive 
advantage in some more or less well-defined field of play» (2018, p. 1). In 
contrast, truth prerequires an attitude that establishes a valuable program of 
inquiry. 
On the other hand, Haack posits that there are many truths, or rather, many 
true propositions, beliefs or theories. Still, these truths cannot be considered true 
in the absolute sense, because they depend on the context and on systems of 
concepts and beliefs. Therefore, it is interesting to distinguish between «truth-
of» and plain «truth» (cf. Haack 2005). For example, the truth-of natural selection 
theory is relative to a whole conceptual system developed by Darwin and his 
successors. It depends on: (i) experience with artificial selection, (ii) a particular 
concept of species, (iii) the Malthusian model of the relation between population 
growth and natural resources, and other factors. Moreover, like any other 
scientific theory, the truth-of natural selection depends on its scientific 
acceptability based on criteria which the scientific community has been 
developing for centuries.    
This argument revolves around an idea: it is possible to decide what is better 
and what is worse. There are better and worse explanations, theories that are 
better than others, and beliefs that are more reliable than others. Even if we 
accept that the truth of beliefs is relative to an entire conceptual system, which is 
influenced by socio-cultural context, it does not mean we must assume that 
«anything goes».  
People use criteria to compare different situations. Language games, 
conceptual schemes or cultural spheres are not windowless monads, which would 
otherwise lead to isolation or communication paralysis. Two members from very 
different communities can debate about the truth-of their respective beliefs 
because they have something in common. For example, an economist and a 
househusband share the basis that, for p to be true, p has to happen in reality. 
That is to say, they do not consider that there are two propositions P and P’, being 
P true for the economist and P’ true for the househusband, and that through 
negotiation they will reach the truth. Actually, all of us use such criteria 
concerning truth: for instance, when somebody says «it is true that I am drinking 
water», that sentence is true if and only if what she is drinking is water and not 
vodka; or if we read in the newspaper that there is inflation in Mexico, that 
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sentence in the newspaper is true only if inflation is actually happening in 
Mexico.3 
The main issue is not in the concept of truth, but what we are willing to 
stipulate as evidence supporting that belief, and the reliability of the methods 
that we have agreed to use. When the economist and the househusband cannot 
reach an agreement, it is not because they have different concepts of truth, but 
instead because they use different methods for judging, validating and 
interpreting. Specifically, social negotiation is needed to agree on what 
constitutes good evidence, and how to interpret it. The scientific institution, over 
the course of its history, has reached agreements on these matters. Yet the 
concept of truth is the same as the concept used by Aristotle, or the same one as 
we use on a daily basis.  
Having said that, usually, the reason why two individuals or two communities 
fail to reach an agreement about the truth of a belief (or a theory) is because 
they use arguments based on different evidence, or arguments based on different 
interpretations of the evidence. Does this mean we are defending a relativistic 
argument? Not necessarily. Science has been considered successful in developing 
methods for obtaining evidence and interpreting it, its primary goal being to 
obtain true knowledge (albeit fallible, partial, relative and provisional). That does 
not mean that scientific evidence is the only acceptable kind of evidence. If we 
are not dealing with a scientific problem, other kinds of methods for harvesting 
evidence could be even more valid. 
In the post-truth era, the situation is different. There cannot be discussion 
about the truth of a theory or a belief between participants who, on the one side, 
are using an epistemic criterion such as truth, and others who reject the existence 
of such criteria (for example, between a scientist — a doctor of medicine — and 
a pseudoscientist — a homeopath). The scientist will base her position on 
arguments derived from scientific evidence that lead to truths (partial and 
context-dependent), while the pseudo-scientist is not interested in truth, nor in 
evidence. Scientists carry out inquiries, whose objective is knowledge and truth, 
while pseudo-scientists carry out pseudo-inquiries, whose purpose is to reinforce 
a pre-established belief or other goal that has nothing to do with truth. 
Homeopathy does not aim to achieve truths through scientific analysis of 
evidence. The objectives of homeopathy are mainly monetary. 
If scientists do not quest for truth and do not use the truth-concept as a 
criterion to choose between scientific propositions and theories, science as an 
 
3  Even when «Mexico», «inflation» and «newspapers» are human constructions. 
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epistemic undertaking will end. Science will become a mere business transaction, 
where truth is irrelevant in comparison to productivity. The academic survival of 
the scientists will be so threatened that, instead of searching for «significant or 
substantial truths» (in Haack’s words), they will work for their own protection 
and promotion, and science will cease to be reliable as knowledge producer. 
Some relativists (or even no relativists) could argue that there is not a unified 
truth-concept. However, even though the truth-concept is context-dependent or 
dependent on a conceptual framework, all inquiry pursues true knowledge and 
uses truth-concept as a criterion. If scientific inquiry is (and as it should be) an 
epistemic activity and process, then its main goals and criteria must be epistemic. 
Otherwise, we would be dealing with pseudo-inquirying. 
 
§4. Epistemic Democracy 
In this section, we explore a possible framework for epistemic democracy, based 
on the pragmatist notions of inquiry and evidence elicited in the previous 
sections, as well as on the Deweyan concept of deliberative democracy. Epistemic 
democracy is a relatively recent concept, but with a longstanding history. 
Epistemic democracy emerged in the 1980s, in an article by Joshua Cohen 
(1986): 
 
«An epistemic interpretation of voting has three main elements: (1) an independent standard 
of correct decisions —that is, an account of justice or of the common good that is independent 
of current consensus and the outcomes of votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting —that is, the 
view that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies are according to the 
independent standard, not personal preferences for policies; and (3) an account of decision 
making as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light 
of the evidence about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of others» (Cohen 1986, 
p. 34). 
 
There have been a range of theories on ways in which to understand epistemic 
democracy, from Aristotle’s argument for the «doctrine of the wisdom of the 
multitude»; the Rousseau and Condorcet Jury Theorem; Mill’s defence of the 
deliberative capacity of assemblies; and classical pragmatism. All of them, though, 
have the same idea in common: Epistemic democracy stands opposed to the 
«aggregate conception of democracy»: i.e. democracy is more than the mere 
aggregation of the expression of individual preferences. For those who defend 
epistemic democracy, voting is a cognitive activity. «To vote presupposes a 
procedure independent standard of correctness […] in contrast to a view of 
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democracy that says that the right outcome is whatever the procedure defines» 
(Knight et al. 2016, p. 142). 
The approach has been criticised because it puts excessive emphasis on the 
procedural aspect of decisions, while being less careful regarding the quality of 
the decisions that are the outcome of that procedure. Democracy has also to 
pursue «good outcomes» (Rothstein, 2019), not just consensual agreements. 
However, recent developments of epistemic democracy hold that we do not have 
to accept any decision just because it has been obtained by democratic procedure, 
but that decision has to be made on an independent account of justice, the 
common good, or even the truth. Defenders of epistemic democracy 
(Schwartzberg 2013) consider that deliberative democracy is the best instrument 
to pursue the best decision, in the sense of the most appropriate one, because 
the agreement is based on universal validity (Geltungsanspruch in the words of 
Habermas). Hèléne Landemore goes further, viewing epistemic democracy as a 
subset of deliberative democracy, but as far as deliberative democracy is 
concerned about the mechanism that affords legitimacy to democratic decisions: 
 
«They have to be the outcome of deliberate process. But epistemic democracy is interested in 
two other questions: (i) whether the substantive nature and context of democratic outcomes 
should matter in establishing the authority and legitimacy of such democratic procedure. 
[And….] (ii) Do we have reasons to believe that democratic institutions actually have any 
epistemic properties, that is, do they track the truth or produce good decisions overall in some 
sense» (Knight et al. 2016, p. 143). 
 
From our point of view, epistemic democracy is the best available option to deal 
with the challenges of the post-truth era. Among the different facets of epistemic 
democracy developed, «pragmatist cognitivism» fits better than other 
possibilities. «Pragmatist cognitivism» is the term coined by Misak and Talisse 
(2014) on the basis of Peircean pragmatism and Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action. However, we favour a Deweyan possibility, as Putnam 
(1989), Anderson (2006), Festenstein (2004, 2019), and Bacon (2010) have 
previously done: «Dewey’s thought seems to provide a rich set of potential 
resources for the epistemic democrat» (Festenstein 2019). 
As Michael Bacon has argued, «there are reasons for preferring a Deweyan 
account, in which the pursuit of truth is seen as part of a wider conception of 
human flourishing» (Bacon, 2010, p. 1076). Dewey’s philosophical approach 
shares a good deal with that of Peirce – for instance, their rejection of ‘spectator 
theory’, their consideration of inquiry as an experimental process, their defence 
of scientific knowledge and scientific method, and their anti-skeptical and anti-
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foundationalist attitude. However, a Peircean account does not recognise the 
possibility of “pluralism about epistemic norms” (Bacon, 2010, p. 1781). Dewey, 
instead, considered deliberative democracy as the place where citizens can 
express their beliefs, but more than that, it is the place where they can grow, 
where nobody should be left aside. 
Democracy was a major topic for Dewey, and it was a crucial part of his works 
on education, religion, science, aesthetics and metaphysics (Bernstein 2010; 
Calcaterra 2011). In the famous debate with Walter Lippmann, Dewey agrees with 
his analysis of the weaknesses of the democratic system: there is a disparity 
between theoretical and practical aspects of democracy; the role of propaganda 
for manipulating public opinion, which uses groups’ prejudices and emotional 
bias; and the disorganisation of the public. The public, for Dewey, consists of 
individuals who may be affected by the indirect consequences of political 
decisions: a public that must have the power to choose, among different 
representatives, those who can best defend the public interests (Dewey 1927, p. 
32). However, Dewey disagrees with Lippmann in his analysis about citizens’ 
surrender of their power to an elite. From Dewey’s point of view, human beings 
are dynamic inquirers — they solve problems in the same way as scientists or 
artists, but in either case, they cannot be treated as mere spectators (Dewey 1939, 
p. 55-65). If the elites treat citizens as individuals with the capacity to develop 
intelligent habits for inquiry, the aspiration of a self-governed public can be an 
ideal for which to aim. A community of educated inquirers, leaders, experts and 
ordinary citizens, working together in deliberative processes, can transform their 
reality to achieve something close to the democratic ideal. The capacity of elites 
to grasp public interest will be always misrepresented by their position at the top 
of the hierarchy. Moreover, self-determination and participation are assets in 
themselves: aspects of the positive freedom that we should practise, because 
deliberative processes are tied to human flourishing. In the unlikely event of a 
trustworthy elite, citizens cannot give up to their capacity to make their own 
choices on the issues that are of concern to them.4 
According to James Kloppenberg, Dewey’s «democratic community replicates 
the community of broadly conceived scientific inquiry that serves as the prototype 
of instrumental reasoning» (1994, p. 90). «Scientific moral» is «part of the 
 
4 In a similar vein, David Estlund has expounded the epistemic dimension of deliberation: «Experts should 
not be privileged because citizens cannot be expected or assumed (much less encouraged or forced) to 
surrender their moral judgement, at least on important matters –to say, “that still doesn’t seem right to me, 
but I shall judge it to be right because I expect this person or that thing to indicate reliably what is right”» 
(Estlund 1997, p. 183). 
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ordinary equipment of the ordinary individual for the healthy functioning of 
democracy» (Festenstein 1997, p. 87). The goal of science «is wholly a moral 
matter, an affair of honesty, impartiality and generous breadth of intent in search 
and communication. The adulteration of knowledge is due not to its use, but to 
vested bias and prejudice, to the one-sidedness of outlook, to vanity, to conceit of 
possession and authority, to contempt or disregard of human concern in its use» 
(Dewey 1927, p. 175-176). 
Scientific morality trains us for deliberation, transforming wishes and self-
interests, (Dewey 1942-48/2008, p. 182). At the same time, scientific morality 
promotes a critical attitude regarding our wishes: my private judgement about a 
specific issue P, that P should be embraced, is not sufficient reason for the 
embracing of P in the public debate. To say, «P is one of the interests of my 
group», «P has been always the case» or «I argue that P» is insufficient if what we 
are pursuing are valid arguments for the acceptance of P. Actually, one of the 
benefits of the process is the possibility of changing the point of view, at least 
partially, on the basis of one other’s arguments and opinions. We can enrich our 
perspectives and experiences and broad our worldviews. Participation in 
community in deliberative processes transforms narrow and selective 
perspectives, turning private interests in social ones, benefitting the community 
as a whole.  
 
«The epistemic virtues of tolerance and open-mindedness shade into imaginative sympathy with 
the travails of others and a reluctance to use force to impose one’s views. The commitment to 
participate, to offer arguments and to hear the views of others, has the psychological corollary 
of leading participants to think in terms of possible criticism and alternative views, and to 
conceive of their own interest in a way which takes account of the interests and views of other 
participants» (Festenstein 1997, p. 88).  
 
Democracy guarantees the conditions for inquiry. In inquiry, individuals have to 
have access «to evidence, arguments, other forms of information, and processes 
of reason-exchange. If we want our inquiry to be successful, we should not 
prejudge its outcomes, by excluding sources of experience that allow us to 
explore and correct our hypotheses» (Festenstein 2019, p.15). There is no 
difference between a normal citizen and a scientist more than a matter of grade. 
All of us are (or should be) inquirers, the scientific community has developed 
the best methods to gather evidence and to solve problems, but those methods 
are just a sophistication of our best strategies to deal with the world. Dewey’s 
epistemic explanation considers that human beings: 
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«Engage in inquiry as part of an existential struggle to cope with a precarious but improvable 
environment. Experience flows until a problematic situation is encountered or identified: then 
ideas, experiments, and the obstacle circumvented or direction changed. Inquiry is demanded 
by what he calls an incomplete situation; that is, one in which something must be done, as a 
response to precarious, unstable and uncertain conditions» (Festenstein 2019, p.14). 
 
As a matter of fact, Dewey is more interested in the «scientific attitude» than in 
scientific outcomes — i.e. the practice of methods of observation, reflection, and 
verification. In that sense, Dewey (in contrast to Peirce) considers that the most 
important goal is to persist in inquiring, not just to reach true conclusions, but to 
listen to others’ arguments, and to maintain an «experimental attitude» on the 
part of individuals, or groups of individuals, toward their beliefs, goals and values 
(Dewey, 1939). In that process, we will be aware of «the needs and claims of 
others» (Dewey, 1932, p. 304).  
In Freedom and Culture, Dewey points out that when we observe science from 
this angle, the role of science as part of culture takes on a different hue: «the 
future of democracy is allied with the spread of the scientific attitude. It is the 
sole guarantee against wholesale misleading by propaganda. More important still, 
it is the only assurance of the possibility of a public opinion intelligent enough to 
meet present social problems’ (Dewey 1939, p. 57). In a similar vein, in Creative 
Democracy –The Task Before Us (an essay written for the commemoration of his 80th 
birthday, in the context of the rise of fascism in Europe), Dewey draws attention 
to:  
 
«A genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conducting disputes, 
controversies and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the 
other a chance to express itself, instead of having one party conquer by forceful suppression of 
the other – a suppression which is none the less one of violence when it takes place by 
psychological means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation» (Dewey 1940, p. 223). 
 
Democracy is an ongoing project, and more; it can be no other way. «It is an ideal 
that serves as a critical standard for evaluating the deficiencies of “really existing” 
democracies and serves also as a guide for concrete action» (Bernstein 2010, p. 
77).  
For Anderson, «John Dewey’s experimentalist account of democracy offers a 
better model of the epistemology of democracy than other alternatives. One of 
the advantages of Dewey’s model is that it allows us to represent dissent, even 
after a decision has been made, as epistemically productive, not merely a matter 
of error (2006, p. 8). Dewey’s democratic theory encompasses the virtues that 
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Landemore (2017) pointed out about epistemic democracy: on the one hand, 
deliberation, to be a fruitful process, must have some kind of epistemic 
properties; it has to have a procedure-independent standard of correctness. In 
the case of Dewey’s argument, as every citizen is a dynamic inquirer, all of them 
can have something to contribute to the debate, and at the same time can enrich 
their opinions in the process of dialoguing, learning from others, and qualifying 
their points of view about the topic in discussion. However, this does not mean 
that every opinion has equal value. Some opinions may be based on better 
evidence than others, and those built on values similar to the scientific ones are 
more likely to contribute to the debate in a more sophisticated way. 
However, Dewey’s theory also takes account of another virtue indicated by 
Landemore:  
 
«An important advantage of the epistemic turn is that it can potentially generate a 
(re)connection of political theory with the empirical sciences (particularly political science and 
economics) by making sense of attempts to trace causal relationships between democratic 
procedures (deliberation but not only) and certain types of outcomes (e.g. growth, peace, or 
some other welfare or happiness indicator, or even levels of democracy)» (2017, p. 286). 
 
A genuine epistemic democracy has to be based on those two principles 
identified by Dewey: (i) trust in the capacities of every member of a society to 
participate in deliberation, and (ii) capacities that arise from their own nature as 
epistemic inquirers. It does not mean that every opinion is equally relevant; 
rather, those that have been reached by a process based on the practice of 
methods of observation, reflection and verification will be more qualified than 
those based on prejudice, self-interest and sloppiness.  
On the basis of Dewey’s consideration about deliberation and Haack’s 
thoughts about inquiry and pseudo-inquiry, it is possible to deal with post-truth 
situations — firstly because both agree that even our most cherished beliefs are 
open to potential revision, but also due to the fact that, if we have accepted some 
theories, it is because: 
 
«They have been developed using the most appropriate available methods, because they satisfy 
our relevant standards of evaluation, and because they work (i.e. they allow us to do what we 
wish to do with the theories in question); we use the methods we do because they have shown 
themselves to be efficient in allowing us to come up with acceptable theories» (Geuss, 2001, p. 
125).  
 
22  |  ANA CUEVAS-BADALLO AND DANIEL LABRADOR-MONTERO 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
Obviously, discrepancies will arise during deliberation, inasmuch as there are 
always different possible options to deal with a problematic situation. However, 
as pointed out in previous sections, when individuals are participating in a 
deliberative process, they at least need to reach some agreement about the quality 
of the evidence supporting their belief, as well as about the reliability of the 
methods they have agreed to use. Those situations where post-truth has been 
used (Brexit, Trump presidential campaign, anti-vaccine movement, climate-
change denial, etc.) are outside of a real epistemic deliberative democratic 
process, not because the positions maintained are definitively wrong (there could 
be good reasons for wishing to leave the EU, for voting for Donald Trump, for 
not using vaccines, or for thinking that the climate change is not just the outcome 
of anthropogenic factors), but because the positions are based on wrong 
evidence, or wrong ways of inquiry. Epistemic deliberative democracy is a process 
where everybody can defend their own opinion, but on the basis of good evidence 
– i.e. evidence gathered by adequate procedures of inquiry. It is not a process, as 
Fuller maintains, where every opinion has the same value and where everything 
goes as long as we are playing the game of power.   
 
§5. Conclusions 
As mentioned, post-truth is based on an epistemic indifference, which is used to 
spread opinions without any independent standard of correct decisions. Better 
said, the standard in post-truth is the subjective preference of the person or group 
holding the opinion. There is no need to refer to any other source, and it is even 
possible to invent the source, because nobody will take the trouble to confirm the 
data.  
In recent times, the situation has worsened, with the use of social networks and 
the «filter bubble» (Pariser, 2011). People are dispelled from other viewpoints, 
and this isolation is aggravated because users believe they are getting a complete 
view of reality. As Sunstein (2007) has pointed out, interpersonal relationships 
on the Internet are not based on debate, deliberation, and learning, but on the 
exclusion of alternative points of view. On the other hand, the search for 
information is not built upon contrast and inquiry. Filter bubbles are inevitable, 
in order to deal with the overwhelming excess of information sources. However, 
those bubbles are based on the «natural human tendency to make choices with 
respect to entertainment and news that do not disturb our pre-existing view of 
the world» (Sunstein, 2007, p. 52). 
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The other aspect of post-truth that we have pointed out is its relation with the 
socio-political realm, where intentions, interests and methods for transmitting 
the message are intertwined. Using Pareto’s terminology, the foxes (elites trying 
to get power) spread post-truths in the conventional mass media, but also 
through social media. Citizens in their bubbles do not act as inquirers, but as 
gullible individuals, following them without criticism, marching towards disaster. 
This is the kind of democracy resulting from post-truth and not the epistemic 
democracy described by Fuller. As Baker and Oreskes have pointed out, the 
solution involves better science and more of it; not more relativism. This point 
was made by Dewey many decades ago:  
 
«We believe that a willingness to discriminate, outside of scare quotes, between knowledge and 
ignorance or truth and falsity is vital for a scholarly agenda that respects one of the insights that 
scholars like Jasanoff have repeatedly and compellingly championed: in contemporary 
democratic polities, science matters» (Baker and Oreskes 2017, p. 9). 
 
In a post-truth situation, citizens do not concern themselves with listening to 
others’ arguments. They are committed to pseudo-inquiry, in both senses 
identified by Haack. They do not look for evidence and do not engage in any 
kind of social negotiation to agree on what is good evidence and how to interpret 
it.  
Though it can be difficult to engage in deliberation with defenders of post-
truths, it is not impossible. We have to be open to listening to their arguments, 
trying to understand the reasons and sources behind their beliefs. If they are 
willing to participate in deliberation, to listen to our arguments, and to analyse 
our evidence, maybe — just maybe — there is the possibility of reaching some 
conclusions. Of course, it will be difficult to sit and talk with somebody who 
denies not just the evidence itself, but even the validity of the method for getting 
good evidence. However, following in Dewey’s footsteps, if we do not participate 
in deliberation with post-truth defenders, we would be irresponsible, and 
immoral, given that deliberation aims to promote humans’ growth and 
flourishing. To draw once more on Dewey, the only solution for the problems of 
democracy is more democracy: a real epistemic democracy. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS/AGRADECIMIENTOS 
Daniel Labrador-Montero is a PhD student at University of Salamanca. His 
participation in this paper has been possible thanks to a public scholarship grant 
24  |  ANA CUEVAS-BADALLO AND DANIEL LABRADOR-MONTERO 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
funded by the Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Castilla y León and the 
European Social Fund.  
  
DEMOCRACY AND INQUIRY IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA  |  25 
 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
REFERENCES 
ANDERSON, Elisabeth (2006). «The Epistemology of Democracy». Episteme 3 (1-2): 
pp. 8-22. 
BACON, Michael (2010). «The politics of truth: A critique of Peircean deliberative 
democracy». Philosophy & Social Criticism 36 (9):  pp. 1075-1091. 
BAKER, Erik and ORESKES, Naomi (2017). «It’s No Game: Post-Truth and the 
Obligations of Science Studies». Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 
(8): pp. 1-10. 
BERNSTEIN, Richard J. (2010). The Pragmatic Turn. Maleden: Polity. 
BERNSTEIN, Richard J. (2012). «Creative democracy—The task still before us».	In: 
The Pragmatic Century: Conversations with Richard J. Bernstein, edited by Sheila G. 
Davaney & Warren G. Frisina. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2012, 191-203. 
BERNSTEIN, Richard J. (2015). Pragmatic encounters. Routledge. 
CALCATERRA, Rosa Maria (2011). Idee Concrete: Percorsi Nella Filosofia di John Dewey. 
Marietti 1820. 
COHEN, Jules. (1986). «An epistemic conception of democracy». Ethics 97 (1): pp. 
26-38. 
DEWEY, John (1927). The public and its problems. New York.  
DEWEY, John (1929/1984), «The Quest for Certainty». In John Dewey: The Later 
Works (1925-1953). Vol. 4. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 
DEWEY, John. (1939/1989). Freedom and Culture. Prometheus. 
DEWEY, John (1939/1993). The political writings. Hackett Publishing. 
DEWEY, John (1932/1981-92). Ethics With J. H. Tufts, 2nd edn, In The Later Works. 
Vol. 7. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 
DEWEY, John. (1940). Creative democracy: The task before us. New York: GP Putnam's 
Sons, pp. 220-228. 
DEWEY, John. (1942-48/2008). «Religion and Morality in a Free Society». In John 
Dewey: The Later Works, Essays, Reviews, and Miscellany, Vol. 15, Carbondale, 
Southern Illinois University Press: 170-183. 
ESTLUND, David. (1997). «Beyond fairness and deliberation: The epistemic 
dimension of democratic authority». Deliberative democracy: Essays on reason and 
politics 173: pp. 173-204. 
FEMIA, Joseph V., & MARSHALL, Alasdair J. (Eds.) (2012). Vilfredo Pareto: beyond 
disciplinary boundaries. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
26  |  ANA CUEVAS-BADALLO AND DANIEL LABRADOR-MONTERO 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
FESTENSTEIN, Matthew. (1997). Pragmatism and political theory: from Dewey to Rorty, 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 
FESTENSTEIN, Matthew. (2004). «Deliberative democracy and two models of 
pragmatism». European Journal of Social Theory 7 (3): pp. 291-306. 
FESTENSTEIN, Matthew (2019). «Does Dewey Have an 'Epistemic Argument’ for 
Democracy?». Contemporary Pragmatism, Forthcoming. 
FRANKFURT, Harry G. (2009). On bullshit. Princeton University Press. 
FULLER, Steve (2018). Post-truth: Knowledge as a power game. Anthem Press. 
GEUSS, Raymond, (2001). History and illusion in politics. Cambridge University 
Press. 
HAACK, Susan (1993). Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology. 
Oxford: Blackwell.  
HAACK, Susan (1996). «Concern for Truth. What it Means, Why it Matters». Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences 775 (1): pp. 57- 63. 
HAACK, Susan (1999). «Staying for an answer. The Untidy Process of Groping for 
Truth». Times Literary Supplement: pp. 12-14. 
HAACK, Susan (2002a). «The Untidy Process of Groping for Truth». Think 1 (1): 
pp. 67-74. 
HAACK, Susan (2002b). «The same, only different». The Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 36 (3): pp. 34-39. 
HAACK, Susan (2005). «The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths». Principia 
9 (1–2): pp. 87–109.  
HERMAN, Edward S., & CHOMSKY, Noam (1989). Manufacturing consent: The 
political economy of the mass media. Random House. 
HIGGINS, Kathleen. (2016). «Post-truth: a guide for the perplexed». Nature News 
540 (7631): p. 9. 
KNIGHT, Jack, LANDEMORE, Hélène, URBINATI, Nadia & VIEHOFF, Daniel. (2016). 
«Roundtable on Epistemic Democracy and Its Critics». Critical Review (28) 2: 
pp. 137-170. 
KLOPPENBERG, James (1994). The Virtues of Liberalism. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
LANDEMORE, Hélène (2017). «Beyond the Fact of Disagreement? The Epistemic 
Turn in Deliberative Democracy». Social Epistemology 31(3): pp. 277-295. 
LATOUR, Bruno (2004). «Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact 
to matters of concern». Critical inquiry 30 (2): pp. 225-248. 
DEMOCRACY AND INQUIRY IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA  |  27 
 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
LATOUR, Bruno, and WOOLGAR, Steve. (1979) Laboratory life: The construction of 
scientific facts. Princeton University Press. 
MCCOMISKEY, Bruce (2017). Post-truth rhetoric and composition. University Press of 
Colorado. 
MISAK, Cheryl and TALISSE, Robert. (2014). «Pragmatist Epistemology and 
Democratic Theory». Journal of Political Philosophy 22: pp. 366-76. 
PARISER, Eli (2011). The Filter Bubble. New York: The Penguin Press. 
PUTNAM, Hilary (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
PUTNAM, Hilary (1989). «A reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy». The Southern 
California Law Review 63: p. 1671 
PUTNAM, Hilary (1995). Pragmatism. An Open Question. Oxford and Cambridge: 
Blackwell 
PUTNAM, Robert D. (2001). Blowing Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Touchstone Books by Simon and Schuster. 
ROTHSTEIN, Bo. (2019). «Epistemic Democracy and the Quality of Government». 
European Politics and Society 20 (1): pp. 16-31. 
SAWYER, Michael E. (2018). «Post-Truth, Social Media, and the “Real” as 
Phantasm». In: Relativism and Post-Truth in Contemporary Society. Palgrave 
Macmillan, Cham.: pp. 55-69 
SISMONDO, Sergio (2017). «Post-Truth? ». Social Studies of Science 47 (1): pp. 3-6. 
STANLEY, Jason (2015). How propaganda works. Princeton University Press. 
STICH, Stephen (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of 
Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press.  
SUSTEIN, Cass R. (2007). Republic.com. 2.0. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
ZACKARIASSON, Ulf (2018). Introduction: Engaging Relativism and Post-Truth. In 
Relativism and Post-Truth in Contemporary Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.: p. 
1-17. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR 
ANA CUEVAS-BADALLO is associated professor and director at the Philosophy, Logic, and Aesthetic Department 
of the University of Salamanca. She published on technological sciences epistemology, technological bio-
artefacts and public participation in science and technology. 
28  |  ANA CUEVAS-BADALLO AND DANIEL LABRADOR-MONTERO 
 
 
Disputatio 9, no. 13 (2020): pp. 00-00 
 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
Philosophy, Logic y Aesthetic Departament, University of Salamanca. Avda. Francisco Tomás y Valiente S/N, 
37007 Salamanca - Spain. e–mail (✉): acuevas@usal.es · iD :  http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8080-4233 
 
DANIEL LABRADOR-MONTERO is a PhD student in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of 
Salamanca. He has obtained a public PhD fellowship funded by Junta de Castilla y León and European Social 
Fund. He has a BA in Philosophy and a MA in Social Studies of Science and Technology. His research interests 
are history and philosophy of science and pragmatism. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
Philosophy, Logic y Aesthetic Departament, University of Salamanca. Avda. Francisco Tomás y Valiente S/N, 
37007 Salamanca - Spain. e–mail (✉): danilabra@usal.es · iD :  http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5095-1021 
 
 
HOW TO CITE  TH IS  ART ICLE  
Cuevas-Badallo, Ana and Labrador-Montero, Daniel (2020). «Democracy and Inquiry in the Post-Truth Era: 
A pragmatist Solution». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 9, no. 13: pp. 01–30. 
 
